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Q: I enjoyed the "Dirty Bomb" episode of NOVA. I found it interesting that cesium chloride can be found on eBay (http://cgi.ebay.com/ws/ eBayISAPI.dll?ViewItem&item =3210448041&category=413). In this form, can it be used in a bomb?

Matt Smith
Anchorage, AK

A: Thanks for the interesting question. I checked out the eBay URL that you listed. Based on the description at that Web site, it is unclear whether the cesium that is being sold through eBay is a stable (non-radioactive) isotope or a radioactive isotope, such as cesium-137. Of course, this does raise the question of verifying the legitimacy of purchasers of radioactive materials. In the U.S., possessors of radioactive sources are required to obtain a license from either their state (if it is part of the Agreement States system, which includes 32 out of the 50 states) or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Q: In regards to securing radioactive materials around the world that could be used in nuclear weapons, do you agree with Graham Allison that securing such materials is "doable?" If so, what are the primary objectives, including immediate steps that need to be taken by the U.S. and other countries and a realistic time frame? Do you consider nuclear materials to be the greatest threat to mankind and this planet and, if so, why do you think elimination of this threat isn't our number one priority? Your article, "Commercial Radioactive Sources: Surveying the Security Risks," lists numerous activities that can be pursued to reduce risks associated with nuclear materials. To what extent are such activities ongoing or being considered by the current Administration? Thank you.

Anonymous

A: Yes, I absolutely agree with Dr. Allison that securing radioactive materials is "doable." The study that I co-wrote and that you refer to lists, as you said, "numerous activities that can be pursued to reduce risks associated" with these materials. First, it is important to keep in mind that not all radioactive materials require a high level of security. Only a small fraction of the millions of radioactive sources in use would require high levels of security, because only these materials could fuel a potent dirty bomb. Many of the security activities discussed in my and my co-authors' study have been initiated by the current Administration. Mainly, the Administration needs to make these efforts a high priority. To a significant extent, those officials in the Administration I've talked to are trying to make this effort a high priority. Concerning additional security steps for these materials, regulatory agencies, other government agencies, and the radioactive source industry should work together to develop an integrated, layered defense system. Concerning a significant security gap noted in the "Commercial Radioactive Source" study, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is very much aware of the shortcoming in export control systems that we point out in our report. In fact, the NRC is working on tightening export control regulations in the near future.

Concerning nuclear materials, such as highly enriched uranium and plutonium, which could be used in nuclear weapons and which are different than the commercial radioactive sources discussed above, the U.S. and other countries should prioritize securing, reducing, and eventually eliminating such materials to prevent terrorist use. Currently, Dr. William Potter and I are leading a new study of what exact steps should be taken to accomplish the goal of keeping nuclear weapons-usable material out of the hands of terrorists. We intend to publish this study later this year.

Q: I certainly was enlightened as to the threats from dirty bombs based on viewing the NOVA special. As there is so much missing material in this country and certainly an abundance of uncontrolled or missing material worldwide, it is obvious that somewhere, someplace terrorists will obtain (or have obtained) material relatively easily.

Since dirty bomb construction is relatively easy and the threat may be more psychological than physical based on the Brazilian problem, don't you believe it is a foregone conclusion that one or more of these devices will be used in the world somewhere? How do we prepare and educate the populous? I think chaos is our worst enemy if one of these events happens. I think the NOVA special is an excellent start, and maybe all the broadcast/cable networks should run this episode as a community service. Thank you.

Anonymous

A: Thank you very much for raising the important point about educating the public. As you realize, this is a very challenging task. Nonetheless, I and others in the field believe that this should be done. However, because nuclear issues are rife with controversy, we really need to first identify credible and trustworthy experts who can convey to the public that dirty bombs are typically not going to result in major harm to human health. Because we have never actually experienced a dirty bomb event, it is difficult to know how the public will react. However, if there's only one message that I could convey to the public, it is: "Don't panic." I realize the psychological impediments toward getting this message across. Nonetheless, I feel that we have to start addressing it before a dirty bomb explodes.

Q: Discussions in a forum I participate in have stated that a dirty bomb is best described as a "weapon of mass annoyance," as the radiological exposure effects to any individual not in the immediate area of the blast is minimal at worst. For those in the immediate vicinity, the blast effects overshadow the radiological.

The effects would be in panic among folks who got their concepts of radiation from 1950's "B" movies, and in decontamination of equipment and real estate. What are your thoughts on the subject?

Dave Neil
Rigby, ID

A: In general, I agree with you. The NOVA show made the point that dirty bombs are not weapons of mass destruction (such as nuclear weapons) but are weapons of mass disruption. However, I feel that "annoyance" does not really do justice to capturing the "disruption" that could occur. Yes, the health effects are likely to be minimal. However, the contamination would be real and would have to be cleaned up. Determining the level of cleanup would probably be very contentious. But still the cleanup would likely be expensive. So, this prospect is more of a concern than just an annoyance.

Q: As a nonproliferation expert, why didn't you make the distinction between the levels of risk to the public posed by gamma and beta radiation? I felt the NOVA program sensationalized the actual risks associated with a dirty bomb as compared to the "everyday" radiation risks the population is exposed to (e.g., smoking, radon, medical treatments, etc.) If you are a scientifically minded person, is it not beneficial to inform the public that smoking cigarettes can deliver a concentrated dose to the respiratory system of a few Rem per year, while a dirty bomb would deliver a whole-body dose of a few millirem at most? I agree that the economic impacts of urban contamination could be vast, but I feel you exaggerated the human consequences. Thank you.

Anonymous

A: Thanks for the important questions. Unfortunately, the show was only an hour long. Although NOVA covered much useful information, a lot of valuable information was left on the editing room floor; however, I'm reasonably confident that the filmmakers would have included the information you mention in your questions if they had more than an hour for the film length. During my interview with the filmmakers, I discussed many of the points that you raised. In particular, I mentioned that on average about 20 percent of the population will die from cancer. This substantial subset of the population would develop cancers from many causes, such as smoking cigarettes. I also mentioned during the filming that the typical dirty bomb attack would likely lead to a very slight increase in the risk of developing cancer. To give the filmmakers credit for balanced reporting, they did mention at least a few times during the NOVA show that it is likely that few, if any, people would die in the near term from the ionizing radiation exposure. I feel that the filmmakers also showed that the greatest threat from a dirty bomb is due to the contamination clean up costs and other economic impacts.

However, I respectfully disagree with you regarding your statement "a dirty bomb would deliver a whole-body dose of a few millirem [which is a very low level of exposure] at most." There are many dirty scenarios that would result in whole-body doses much greater than a few millirem. For example, if we assume that the 1987 Goiania, Brazil radiation safety crisis, though not an intentional attack, was a dirty bomb-like event, several people surely were exposed to much more than a few millirem. In fact, four people died from radiation sickness and many more were significantly contaminated. The material involved in this case was several hundred curies of cesium-137. There are some radioactive sources that could be available to terrorists that contain a lot more radioactivity than the Brazilian source described above.

Q: In The Economist Magazine (6/15/02, p. 28), it was stated that for a dirty bomb "decontamination ... from a few to dozens of city blocks ... poses the greatest challenge." Demolition and the effect on business could run into "hundreds of billions of dollars." Do you agree? If a dirty bomb caused an increased level of radiation in a city, would it be necessary to evacuate and demolish the area?

Also, is there a Web site you recommend for guidance on dealing with a dirty bomb or other radiation risk? Thank you.

Anonymous

A: Factoring in the costs of demolition and reconstruction, I would not be surprised if the costs could soar to hundreds of billions of dollars, especially if the real estate is in Manhattan, for example. Depending on the radiation level that remains after decontamination efforts were attempted, it may be necessary to evacuate the area.

Regarding Web sites, the government has recently launched www.ready.gov, which has some useful textual information about dirty bombs. In general, this Web site is correct to point out the three principles of radiation protection: time, distance, and shielding. Minimize the time in the contaminated area. Maximize the distance between you and the contamination. Maximize the amount of shielding, such as dense buildings, between you and the contamination. I am concerned, however, that some of the cartoon-like illustrations on that Web site give a false impression of the severity of a dirty bomb. In particular, there is an illustration that implies that a substantial part of the state of Texas could be contaminated by a dirty bomb. This is incorrect. Dirty bombs would be far less damaging.

Q: I understand that potassium iodide (KI) should be taken to protect the thyroid in the case of radioactive iodine release with a nuclear emergency. Because there is so little time to respond after a "dirty bomb" or nuclear emergency, it seems it would be wise to take a potassium iodide tablet after an explosion to be safe, rather than wait the hours that may be needed to assess the type of radioactive material that is released. By then it would be too late to do anything. What is your opinion of this?

Barbara Smith
Austin, TX

A: I understand the concerns about potential health hazards. However, I would caution against overuse of KI. It is unlikely that a dirty bomb would contain radioactive iodine. Other more prevalent and dangerous radioactive materials would probably be used in a dirty bomb. There would probably be sufficient time for response officials to analyze the radioactive materials and determine whether radioactive iodine is present. So, I personally would not rush to take KI immediately after an explosion.

Q: We have a cancer center here in town. I live one mile away. They have two linear accelerators there. What would happen if a terrorist walked into the center and blew the accelerators up while they were on?

Jeffrey Ross
Muskegon, MI

A: Linear accelerators are not useful for dirty bombs. If a terrorist blew up the accelerators, there would be damaged equipment, but there would not be a radiological dispersal crisis. If the power is turned off, an accelerator cannot produce radiation. The bomb blast would almost assuredly turn off the power to the accelerators.

Q: If there are devices, as we have seen, that can detect even small amounts of radiation from a vehicle such as a helicopter, then why can't the Georgian government use this technology to try and track down the missing generators from the lighthouses that the NOVA program described?

Anonymous

A: Yes, radiation detection equipment as you described can be used to track down the missing generators. However, in my discussions with Abel Gonzalez of the IAEA, I've found out that such searches can be very expensive and time consuming. In addition to the mission described on NOVA, there have also been other successful IAEA- and Georgian government-sponsored missions to track down radioactive materials in Georgia. Last year, the IAEA, the U.S. Department of Energy, and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy renewed efforts to track down these highly radioactive materials. Such searches could be accelerated if Russia is able to release and/or find records of where these materials may be located. The bottom line is that the IAEA, the U.S., and Russia are seriously working on this problem. We have to make sure that this work remains a high priority.

Q: I am a health physicist here at the University of Miami's Medical Campus. The NOVA broadcast brought up, in the Brazilian example, the problem of overwhelming the health system. But it did not answer the question of how to avoid overwhelming our health-care facilities with people who are "worried well" about future events. How should we plan? Any response would be greatly appreciated. Thank you.

Sam Iverstine
Assistant Rad. Safety Officer
Coordinator for Mass Radiological Events
University of Miami

A: Mr. Iverstine, I would have to defer to your expertise in this area. I have been working in nonproliferation and security studies and have not focused on the health-care system. I would strongly urge that likeminded radiation safety officers come together to help public health and other health-care officials determine how to deal with the issue that you raised. I am aware that the Health Physics Society (HPS) has been examining issues related to this, as you probably know. So, I would advise working with HPS and health-care officials to try to deal with this issue.

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